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Summary  Findings
Throughout  the 1960's  and 1970's  developing  countries  viewed  UNCTAD  rather than the GATT
as the main institution  through which they could promote  their interests  in international  trade. Beginning
with  the Uruguay  Round  in the  mid 1980's  however,  the developing  countries  attitude  changed:  Many more
became members of the GATT and a significant  number  played an active role in the Uruguay Round
negotiations.  The  paper  analyses  the representation  and participation  of the developing  countries  in the  WTO
as of mid-1997  in order  to determine  whether  the developing  countries  can  effectively  promote  their interests
and discharge  their responsibilities  under the rules and agreements  of the new Organization.
The paper concludes  that a duality  in the representation  and participation  of developing  countries
in the WTO has emerged:  On the one hand there are many developing  countries  which have increased
significantly  their capacity  to participate  in WTO  activities  in the aftermath  of the Uruguay  Round  and whose
representatives  are playing  an active  role in the decisions  of the organization.  Their participation  in formal
and informal  decision  making  processes  is substantial,  although  they  frequently  do not speak  with one voice
as their interests,  depending  on the issue, may  diverge  and result  in the forming  of different  coalitions.  On
the other  hand, there is an even  larger group of primarily  smaller  and lower income developing  countries,
which account for more than 50% of total WTO developing  country membership,  for which effective
representation  and participation  in the Organization's  activities  is still a serious problem. Their situation
has changed  little since  the early 1980's. Most  are not represented  in Geneva  and hence  can not effectively
participate  in the consultations  leading  to the development  of consensus  on which  the WTO is based. Their
staffing  has not increased  significantly,  while  the complexity  of the issues  and the number  of meetings  and
obligations  in the WTO has multiplied  significantly.For many  developing  countries  and especially  for the least  developed  and some of the smaller  island
economies,  institutional  weaknesses  are the major constraints  in both meeting  their obligations  under the
WTO and in effective  participation  in the Organization  and representation  of their interests. Institutional
development  is a complex  process, that takes a great deal of time. As a consequence,  the solution  of the
problems  of representation  of the developing  countries  in the WTO is neither easy nor amenable  to quick,
stroke- of- the- pen changes  in policies  or rules.
The major recommendations  for more effective  participation  are as follows:
First, participation  would  be enhanced  through  the establishment  of adequate  staffed  WTO Missions
based in Geneva.  Measures  to increase  effective  representation  in Geneva,  however, should  be taken  pari
passu with measures  to strengthen  the institutional  capacity  at home,  as part  of a broader  decision  to become
more effectively  integrated  in the international  trading  system.  Developing  countries need  to initiate  efforts
to strengthen  the policy  making  and implementation  capacity  of  institutions  that  affect  their ability  to trade
as well as to seek assistance  for this purpose from international  donors  and the WTO itself.
Second, for some countries  with very small  international  representation  in general, it may not be
optimal  use of scarce  human  and  material  resources  to set up such  Geneva  Missions.  In such  cases, the  main
objective  should  be twofold:  (a) to ensure that they have adequate  information  flow on the issues  handled
by the WTO and how they affect  their interests;  and (b) to identify  like minded countries  or groups which
do have effective  representation,  develop  a process of consultation  with them and thereby obtain some
assurance  that their interests  are reflected  on an ongoing  basis.  To this end, countries  need  to explore  inter
alia  whether  they  can pool their resources  and representation  in Geneva  in the context  of regional  groupings
to which they belong, or alternatively,  whether  they can second  one or more staff to already established
Missions in Geneva  of like-minded  countries.Third, countries  need to ensure  that the effectiveness  of their participation  is not impaired  by such
matters  as not paying  their  membership  dues.  The amounts  involved  are  typically  very small;  falling  in arrears
in their payments  can not be a cost effective  policy  even in circumstances  of countries  facing  serious  budget
constraints.
Fourth, the international  community  should  place higher priority  to the more effective  integration
of the developing  countries  in the international  trading system  and their participation  in the WTO. While
many  developing  countries  have made  great strides  in this connection,  institutional  weaknesses  are glaring
and impose  serious constraints  in many others, especially  the Least Developed.  Donors in general, and
the Bretton  Woods  institutions,  UNDP, WTO, UNCTAD  and the ITC in particular,  should  increase their
support  and assistance  to well  co-ordinated  programs  of institutional  development  that enhance  the capacity
of developing  countries  -- whether on the Least Developed  country  list or not-- to participate  effectively
in the international  trading system, and to permit them to meet their obligations  in the WTO. Such an
institutional  strengthening  is a sine qua non for effective  representation  of developing  country interests  in
the WTO, as well as for the accession  to the WTO of countries  which are not yet members.
Fifth, the WTO should  undertake  a review  of its internal  rules and procedures--such  as the rule that
delegations  of countries  presenting  cases  before  the Dispute  Settlement  Body  (DSB) include  only government
employees--to  ensure  that  they  do not inadvertedly  prejudice  the effective  participation  of developing  countries.
It would  also appear  desirable  for the WTO to increase the resources  it allocates  from its own budget  to
provide  assistance  to developing  countries  to enable  them  to discharge  the obligations  entailed  by membership
in the Organization  as well  as to assist  others  to accede.  This does  not necessarily  mean  that  the WTO should
increase  its own staffing  for undertaking  technical  assistance  activities.  It does mean that the WTO should
allocate  an appropriate  amount  of resources  from its  budget  to the tasks  of supporting  effective participation
of all its membership  in its activities  and assisting needy  non-members  in their accession  process, so as
to become a truly global institution.- 2 -
THE PARTICIPATION  OF  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  IN THE WTO
I.  Introduction
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, developing  countries viewed UNCTAD rather than GATT
as the main institution through which they could promote their interests in international  trade. Their
representation in  GATT reflected  these priorities: Many developing countries were not members,
and of those that were, a large number did not maintain official representatives resident in Geneva,
but instead used representatives  in other European  capitals  to cover GATT  matters -- for ACP countries
usually their Mission to the EU in Brussels. Moreover, their participation  in GATT negotiations  prior
to the Uruguay Round, was "passive" in that they did not engage in a significant way in the mutual
exchange of concessions on a reciprocal basis (Whalley, 1987).
Beginning with the Uruguay Round, developing countries' attitude towards participation in
the GATT and, subsequently, in the WTO changed significantly:  Many developing countries played
a very active role in the Uruguay Round negotiations;  and a large number  decided to become members
ofWTO. This  attitude  change  reflects anumber of complex  and inter-relateddevelopments:  Developing
countries, in general,  have become more effectively integrated in the international trading system,
and several have become major exporters of manufactures.  Trade policies in many countries have been
liberalized,  favouring an outward orientation and lower protection. And, there has been a growing
appreciation of the importance  of observing international  rules in the conduct of trade as well as the
need to safeguard  trading interests  through  effective  participation  in the activities  of the new organization.
The establishment  of the WTO has resulted in further changes  which place additional  demands
on developing  countries for their effective  participation:  First, the WTO covers  a variety of new areas,
such as services, standards, intellectual  property rights, all of which require additional institutional
capacity in member governments  both for more effective  representation in Geneva  and in their home- 3 -
capitals. Second, the WTO, unlike GATT, has been engaging in a number of on-going negotiations
in the liberalization of different sectors which require continuous active involvement by member
countries. Three such negotiations,  on Basic Telecommunications,  Information Technology  Products
and Financial Services were concluded in 1997 and more are in store starting in 1999, as part of the
built- in agenda of the Uruguay Round.'
A key question  that arises at present  is whether  developing  countries' representation  at the WTO
is adequate  for the pursuit of their effective  participation  in  the activities  of the Organization  and, through
it, the promotion of their interests in the expanding range of issues being addressed. This issue is of
special  importance  because  the WTO, like  the GATT before it, is a member  driven  organization,  meaning
that the bulk of the analytical  work, the development  of proposals  as well as the negotiation  of agreements
falls on the member countries and their representatives.
This paper analyses participation of developing  countries at the WTO as of  mid-1997. The
focus is on three main issues:  (a) representation, as reflected in the existence or not of a Mission of
adequate size dealing with WTO matters located in Geneva; (b) participation  in the affairs of the new
Organization, as reflected  in the allocation of formal chairmanships in the various WTO councils and
subsidiary  bodies and in  the informal  processes  that  characterize  WTO governance  and decision  making;
and (c) institutional  capacity  in home capitals, which is necessary  for both effective  representation  and
participation. Based on this analysis, the last part of the paper draws a number of conclusions and
recommnendations  for the more effective  participation  of developing  countries in the WTO.
'The participation of the developing  countries in these negotiations  will be only noted in passing
rather than analyzed in depth. The participation of the developing countries in the Uruguay Round
has been discussed extensively elsewhere (see especially Croome 1995,  Martin and Winters 1996,
and UNCTAD and WTO, 1996), and is not going to be addressed in this paper.-4  -
II.  The Data
The  basic information  used  for the analysis  of representation  was  provided  by the  WTO/GATT
Directories issued in 1982 and in August of 1987  and 1997. These Directories have a listing of all
staff working  in each  member  country  Mission  dealing  with WTO/GATT  matters as well  as the location
of the Mission. The listings contain only professional  staff - secretarial  and support staff (drivers
etc.) are excluded;  and are usually  headed  by an Ambassador,  permanent  representative  of the country
to the WTO/GATT. As noted above, the representation  may be from a Mission in  Geneva, from
a Mission  elsewhere  in Europe or in a few cases from a Ministry in the capital of the country itself.
They are all listed in the WTO/GATT  Directories  -- whose  format has changed  little over the years;
they have  just become thicker.
The period covered  is of interest  because  it looks at the WTO/GATT  representation  at three
different  points in time, each associated  with a distinct  period in the organization's  activity: 1982 is
before the beginning of the Uruguay  Round, 1987  is a year after the Uruguay  Round  was launched,
and 1997  is the present -- ten years later, when the WTO has  been established  and the implementation
of the Round is in full swing.
The Directories  also  contain  a listing  of the officers  of the Organization  and all subsidiary  bodies,
committees, working groups etc. as well as their country affiliation  which is used in the discussion
of participation  in WTO activities. Chairmen  have traditionally  played a relatively  active role in the
GATT and the WTO -- their role has not been purely cosmetic. An organization like the WTO  -- and
previously the GATT -- which works with consensus  despite  the fact that the countries  represented
are very different in their economic  size, presents complex  challenges  in designing  decision  making
structures  that result  in an equitable  representation  of the interests  of all participants. Chairmanships
play  a role in this effort  to maintain  a reasonable  balance  of interests.  Thus, the share of chairmanshipsand other offices held by the developing  countries  could shed some light on their involvement  and
potential  influence  in the organization,  especially  over time.
Both  measures  -- committee  chairmanships  and  location  and  size  of mission  staffing  obviously
by themselves  do not  necessarily  imply  effectiveness.  The  quality  and effectiveness  of committee  chairmen
and staff varies and there is no way to take account  of such differences  in a systematic  fashion.
There  is also  a concern  as  to whether  staff, listed  in  the Directories  as working  on  WTO/GATT
matters, actually  work only on these  matters, or have responsibilities  regarding  other Geneva  based
international  organizations  as well, dealing  with  unrelated  issues,  such as for example  ILO. Practice
regarding  who  gets listed  in-the  Directories  relative  to what they  actually  do tends to vary: A majority
of  both developed and  developing countries operate joint Missions  - i.e. Missions housing
representatives  to  all international  agencies  in  Geneva  whose  formal  head  is the Ambassador  accredited
to the UN.  In these  cases  most of  the staff  listed  in  the WTO  Directory  also  appear  in  the UN Directory  -
- usually,  but not always,  with an explicit  WTO designation.  But  there is a significant  group  of both
developing  and  developed  countries  operating  separate  WTO  Missions  headed  by a different  Ambassador
and  often  reporting  to a different  Ministry  in  their  capitals.  The  establishment  of separate  WTO  Missions
increased  noticeably  following  the establishment  of the WTO and may have  been partly the result of
the setting  of a separate  WTO  headquarters  agreement  with  the Swiss  authorities. 2 Thus, there  appears
to  be no  systematic  bias  as  between  developing  and  developed  countries  concerning  a divergence  between
their formal designation  in the WTO Directories  and what they actually  work on or on the basis of
whether  there is a separate  WTO Mission  or not.
On the other hand, to the extent  that a large  number  of developing  countries  are represented
in Geneva  by very  small  Missions,  then  the greater  the likelihood  that  staff  in  these  mnissions,  whatever
2Although  inthese  cases  as well,  the  Ambassador  accredited  to the UN  is typically  senior  inrank.See
UN Directory, Geneva, 1997.- 6 -
their  formal designation, would have to deal with other matters as well and hence their capacity to
deal with WTO matters diluted. However,  the use of the measure itself, counting heads,  tends to
introduce an offsetting, small country bias:  At the limit, each country represented has no less than
one representative.  A very small country with a minute proportion of world trade would still have
a representative - and an influence disproportionate to its trade share -- while a country like the US
or  a group  of countries like that of the EC  whose trade or GNP may be  many hundreds or even
thousands of times larger would not be expected to have Missions of proportionate size. 3
But of course, numbers and formal representation and chairmanships do not tell the whole story.
Informal arrangements work along with and sometime supersede the formal committee structure and
arrangements.  Information on these informal processes of developing consensus is hard to document.
In some cases, the groups involved and their membership is a matter of public record. In other cases,
they are not, and the analysis presented here has had to rely on personal interviews with the information
provided on condition of no attribution.
Finally, it was not possible to undertake  a systematic analysis of institutional constraints and
requirements  for effective representation and participation in the WTO for all developing countries.
The main new data presented on this issue are based on the  "Trade Related Technical Assistance Needs
Assessments" prepared by a number of Least Developed Countries in the context of the High Level
Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries' Trade Development held in Geneva
in October  1997.
3It was also thought that Mission size would also be affected by a country's geographical proximity
to Geneva. Were this to be an important factor, it would tend to bias downward the Mission size  of
developed, European countries. It turns out, that if that bias exists, it does not show in the statistics,
as the European countries are substantially represented in Geneva - both through their national missions
and, for EC matters,  through the EC. On the other hand, the distance of most developing countries
from Geneva means that participation in the activities of the organization by representatives from their
capitals is quite costly and raises the importance of having effective representation located in Geneva.-7  -
III.  Membership
The first point to note is the familiar  one that developing  countries  now account  for 74  % of
WTO membership  compared  to 66% in 1982 (Table  1). Only one new member,  Liechtenstein,  was
added over the period that could be considered  a developed  economy.  The overwhelming  majority
of the 43 new members  added,  the bulk  since 1987,  have  been  developing  countries  and,  most recently
a number of transition economies. Membership  increased slightly  -- by  seven countries in the
period 1982-1987,  notably  with  the inclusion  of such  large  developing  countries  as Mexico;  and exploded
with  the addition  of 36 new  members  hence  (see  Table 1)  .'  At  present,  total  WTO  membership  accounts
for over  90% of world exports,  compared  to slightly  more than  75% in 1982.  The largest exporting
countries/territories  currently  not members are China, Chinese Taipei,  Russia and Saudi Arabia. 5
Over  the same  period,  the proportion  of world  exports  accounted  by developing  country  members
of the WTO  increased  even  more, from 11  % in 1982  to 19%  in 1996  (Table  1). This was  both  because
of an increase  in developing  country  membership,  and because  of the rapid expansion  of developing
country  exports in the 1990's. Overall  however,  developing  countries  continue  to represent  a much
larger proportion  of WTO membership  than their share of international  trade.
The  data  on membership  nonetheless,  disguise  the fact  that  a large  number  of developing  countries
have been at any point in time formally "inactive"  for not having  paid their WTO dues for  more
4The following countries  or groups are defined  as "developed"  and "other"  for the purposes of
this paper: "Developed"  include  the fifteen  members  of the European  Communities,  the representative
of the European  Commission,  the four EFTA  countries  (Liechtenstein,Iceland,Norway,  Switzerland),
Australia, Canada, Japan,  New Zealand, the United States; "Other" include Bulgaria,  the Czech
Republic,Hungary,  Israel,  Mongolia,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia,  Sloveniaand  Yugoslavia(not  aWTO
member);  all remaining  countries  and territories  are classified  as "developing".
5WTO  members  can be countries  or customs  territories,  such  as e.g.Hong Kong, which  has been
a member while formally  a colony of the UK and now a part of China. Similarly, the European
Communities  are a member  with a separate  delegation  from those of the 15 fifteen  constituent  states.
For purposes  of simplicity,  the paper  uses the term "country"  whatever  the legal status  of the member
may be.-8  -
than three years. 6 At the beginning  of 1997,  23 developing  countries/territories  were so designated.
Such a designation  implies  that they  are not able to receive  technical  assistance  from the organization,
nor have their representatives  chair WTO bodies, the withholding  of a number  of other privileges,
such as the distribution  of documents  etc.'  Another  seven  developing  countries  were more than one
or two  years in arrears and were  therefore  barred  from chairing  WTO  bodies.  Thus, thirty developing
countries  i.e. about  a third of the total  membership,  was  barred  from chairmanships.  Twenty  of these
were least developed  countries.  Fifteen  had no Missions  in Geneva  and many others had only token
representation.
IV.  Representation
Location  of Missions.  Today,  while  64  developing  countries  members  maintain  WTO  Missions
in Geneva, 26 others continue  to be represented  by Missions  or Embassies  elsewhere  in Europe  and
seven  more list as their representatives  people  located  in  Ministries  at their own  capitals  (see  Table 2a
and Annex).  Two thirds of those  with representation  from other  capitals  in Europe  used their Brussels
mission;  while  the remainder  were  spread  between  Bonn,  London  and  Paris  (See  Annex).  The proportion
of developing  countries  members  of the  WTO  or GATT  actually  represented  in  Geneva  declined  slightly
between  1982  and 1997  from 69% to 66% respectively,  despite  the fact that a number  of countries
such  as Uganda,  Zambia  and  Zimbabwe,  moved  their  representation  from  elsewhere  in Europe  to Geneva
(See  Annex).  By  contrast,  all  developed  country  members  of  the WTO,  with  the except  of  Liechtenstein,
and all transition  economies  have a Mission  in Geneva.  The decline  in the proportion of developing
countries  with  Geneva  representation  is to a considerable  extent  due to the inclusion  as WTO  members
at its establishment,  based  on simplified  procedures,  of a large  number  of smaller  developing  countries
whose  governments  had previously  been applying  the GATT on a de  facto basis.
'These rules are contained  in GATT/PC/7, L\7578
7According  to a recent  WTO  Council  decision,  Least  Developed  countries  in arrears  are no longer
being barred from receiving  technical  assistance  from the Organization..- 9 -
There  are two main reasons for the continued representation of many developing countries
from outside Geneva:  (a) many of the smaller ACP countries consider their main international trade
policy issues to involve relations with the EC rather than the WTO and thus locate their representatives
in Brussels, from where they also are supposed to follow WTO issues;  (b) in addition, a number of
the new members are very small island economies that have very few representatives abroad and simply
can not afford separate Missions in Geneva. Of the 29 least developed countries members of the WTO,
only 12 had representation in Geneva.  Similarly, practically all of the small island economies were
represented from missions in Europe or from capitals.
There is little doubt that representation from Brussels or another Mission in Europe can cause
difficulties, delays and sometimes confusion in the participation of the activities of WTO in Geneva.
The  limitations  and  constraints  to  effective participation in  the  WTO  that  derive  from  lack  of
representation in Geneva have been noted many times ( Blackhurst 1997, UNCTAD 1997);  and they
have been recently documented  in the case of Sierra Leone, a least developed  country with representation
to the WTO from Brussels!A
Size of Missions. At present, the total staff of missions working on WTO matters  in Geneva
as well as developing countries representatives working in European capitals numbers 540, of whom
347 represent developing countries, 168  developed countries and 25 other, mostly transition economies.
This is more than double the number that worked on GATT issues in 1982, with most of the increase
occurring since 1987.9
8See Beatrice Chaytor and Michael Hindley, A Case Study of Sierra Leone's Participation in the
World Trade Organization, Cameron:  1997.
9This is much larger than the expansion of WTO secretariat staff over the same period -- which
went from 340 in 1982 to 383 in 1987 and 515 in 1997, using the Directory as the basis. The two
listings are  not  comparable,  however,  because the secretariat  list  includes support  staff.  As  the
professional staff in the secretariat -- excluding interpreters and translators, does not exceed 200, both
the absolute and the relative increase of WTO professional secretariat staff over the period is likely
to have been much smaller than the expansion of Mission staff.- 10  -
The increase in the total head count is in smaller part due to the increase in WTO membership
and in larger part due to an increase in the average size of Missions dealing with WTO matters. The
average size of Mission increased from 2.9 persons per mission in 1982 to 3.3 persons in 1987 and
to 4.1  persons in 1997, an increase of over 40%, with most of the changes occurring in the decade
since 1987.10
The average size of Mission increased both for developed and developing countries. The average
size Mission for developed countries  increased from 4.1 persons in 1982 to 6.7  persons in 1997 or
more than 50%. For developing countries the average rose exactly by 50% from 2.4 to 3.6 persons
per Mission (see Table 2). " Thus, the difference in the average size of Mission actually increased over
the past fifteen years." 2
The fact that the average Mission for the developing countries continues to be substantially
lower and the difference with developed countries is increasing, should not necessarily be interpreted
as an indicator of relative capacity  for effective representation on issues of interest at the WTO for
the developing countries as  a whole. This is because in this, as in so many areas, the average for
developing countries is quite misleading as it disguises very large variations.
At the one extreme is a group of LDCs or small, low income countries as well as a large number
of small island economies  (for example, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent  and Grenadines
etc) with little trade and basically only nominal representation. The average size of Mission for these
countries was only 1.2 persons.
'"Only five countries (Burundi, Gabon, Malaysia, Portugal and Congo) had  less mission staff
working  on  WTO/GATT  issues in 1997 than in 1982 - and in only a few of these cases it would
appear that the reductions were policy driven.
"The average size of mission in the "other" category, mostly transition economies, did not change.
'2Recall that  "Mission"  is defined to include representatives to the WTO/GATT  listed in the
Directories irrespective  of whether located  in Geneva  or elsewhere. The differences  are actually  somewhat
smaller if one compares only the countries with Missions in Geneva.- 11  -
At the other extreme are the ASEAN countries and Korea whose average size of WTO Mission
in Geneva is in excess of 8 persons, (headed by Korea and Thailand with more than fifteen each) and
thus substantially greater than the average Mission from developed countries.  Representation  from
Latin American countries averages about 5.5 persons per Mission -- i.e. close to developed countries,
and similarly for other developing countries like India and Egypt.
Discussions with representatives of Missions from both developed and developing countries
suggested that they are all hard pressed to cope with the increased number of meetings and activities
of the WTO. According to one estimate (Blackhurst 1997a), there were approximately 40-45 scheduled
WTO meetings in the average working week in 1995-1996. To this one must add all the other informal
gatherings for consultations that occur among delegations  outside formal settings to develop consensus.
Based on informal estimates developed in consultation with a number of Missions, just to follow
the topics of the various WTO bodies and attend their meetings requires a staff of at least 4-5 people,
and the average is increasing.  t3 If one uses this yardstick, it is clear that, as of mid 1997,  a very large
number of developing countries did not meet it. Assuming for example, that effective representation
in the WTO requires  a Mission in Geneva of a size of at least three staff (including the head of the
mission) --which is actually smaller thanthe minimal rangejudged asadequate,  33 developing countries
and territories did not meet it because they did not have a Mission in Geneva; another 17  had a Mission,
almost always  as part of a joint  UN mission, but with less than three staff (including the head of
Mission) assigned to WTO tasks. In addition, there were another six countries, which while having
a nominally adequately sized  Mission in Geneva, (in all cases, joint with the UN and thus harder to
judge on the division of responsibilities) had arrears problems,  as a consequence of which either they
were formally  "inactive" or could not have their representatives elected to WTO bodies. This gives
a total of 56, or close to 60% of the total developing countries members of the WTO being in some
fashion handicapped in being effectively represented.
" 3This is consistent with the estimate for a minimum size mission presented in Blackhurst 1997b).- 12 -
At the same time, there are perhaps 30-35 developing countries including those already noted
and several others which by virtue of their interest in the WTO, the staffing of their Missions and the
leadership of their representatives, play a very active role in the affairs of the organization. They are
the ones which provide the bulk of the formal leadership structure of the WTO and they are the ones
that are being consulted when informal consultations to develop a consensus take place.
V.  Participation
Chairmanships.  The analysis of chairmanships  includes not only chairmen but also vice-chairmen
who had been appointed to a number of the main bodies of the organization and subsidiary committees,
often in order to maintain a balance between developing and developed countries.
The analysis distinguishes  between chairnanships (including  vice-chairmen)  of two main groups:
The first group of "important" chairmanships includes those of the main constituent bodies, such as
the Chairman and Vice Chairnan  of the GATT Council and later the WTO Council on Goods, Services
etc as well as chairmanships of the permanent organs of the GATT and later of the Committee structure
of the WTO.'4 The second group of "less important" chairmanships, includes those of various ad hoc
working groups and other entities established under lesser "authority" -- i.e. those under the multilateral
codes of the GATT, under plurilateral agreements of the WTO, working parties for accession etc. The
distinction is somewhat arbitrary: Under the reorganization following the establishment of the WTO,
a number of groups that functioned before under a "lower authority" of a multilateral code, such as
the anti-dumping committee, or customs valuation were incorporated into the more formal committee
structure of the WTO. But the breakdown is helpful in bringing  out some interesting points about
developing country representation and is used primarily for this purpose.
'4The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the GATT Contracting Parties have been included in the
list of "iimportant"  chairmanships although their functions were mostly ceremonial. According to GATT
practice these positions were held by representatives of countries which the previous year held the same
positions in the GATT General Council.- 13 -
The main findings are presented in Table 3. The Table shows that over the fifteen years covered,
developing countries increased substantially the absolute number of "important" chairmanships they
hold. Indeed, both in 1987 and in 1997 they held in absolute terms more important chairmanships than
the developed countries ( but not by a large margin). In all cases their proportion of chairmanships
is lower than  their share of  the total membership  of the institution but higher than their  share of
international trade.
The distribution of the very top leadership positions of the GATT (Chairman and three Vice
Chairmen of the Council) in 1982  and 1987 seems to have been very carefully balanced: In each instance
the Chairman was either from a developed or developing country (rotating on an annual basis) and
the three vice-chairmen, one each of a developing country, a developed one and a country in transition
(though they were not called that then!).
Similar balance exists at the very top of the WTO leadership positions at present involving
the positions  of the  Chairman  of the  General Council (Brazil) the Chairmen  for the  Councils of
Goods (Norway), Services(Korea) and TRIPS (Chile),  the Dispute Settlement Body( New Zealand),
the Trade Policy Review Body (Pakistan) and key Committees. Indeed, there is a pattern of informal
rotation for the top positions, with the understanding that Chairmanships -- which are for one year --
previously held by a developed country would be succeeded by a developing country and vice -verca. 15
The picture that emerges from looking at the other, lesser chairmanships however, is entirely
different. Both in 1982 an in 1987, very few chairmanships went to developing countries.  This is in
part due to the fact that most of the groups involved focused on the activities of the implementation
of the multilateral  codes in which developing country participation was very limited.  Developing
'5Interestingly enough, very few of these top leadership positions are held by representatives of
the EC, the US or Japan. At the same time the Chair of the Committee on Trade and Development
which deals exclusively with developing country issues, has traditionally been held by somebody from
a developing country.- 14 -
countries  focused  their interest  then on - and maintained  the chairmanships  of -- such groups  as the
Trade and Development  Committee,  relations  with ITC and similar  entities  which had been created
to address  primarily the interests  of the developing  countries  -- not the institution  as a whole.
The situation has changed little in the WTO where the developing  countries again hold
proportionately few of the leadership  positions in bodies dealing  with the implementation  of two
remaining  plurilateral  agreements  but also  very few  of the chairmanships  of the many  working  parties
set up for accession  of new members.  A number  of the accession  working  parties have  been in place
for several  years and their chairmen,  mostly  from developed  countries,  continue  even  after they have
left their positions  in Geneva At the same  time,  there is proliferation  of committees  and working
groups  relative  to the number  of available  high level, experienced  developing  country  representatives
that  have  time to devote  to the expanding  range  of WTO  tasks. If one  judges  that there  are about 30-35
developing  countries  active in WTO affairs,  their Ambassadors  or senior WTO representatives  hold
the chairmanships  of 31  WTO bodies  or other  Committees.  This  is not a bad score,  given that  several
of these  Ambassadors  also  have  to represent  their  countries  at other  international  organizations  in Geneva.
The implications  of the findings  on chairmanships  should  not be exaggerated.  They  do suggest
that the WTO as an institution  is formally  flexible  enough  to accommodate  an increasing  interest on
the part of developing  countries. Whether  this translates  into moving  forward  issues of importance
to the agenda  of the developing  countries  is a somewhat  more complex  issue, however. Preparation
and presentation  of issues does not hinge primarily on the  holding  of chairmanships  or leadership
positions. It is based on a lot of preparatory  work and institutional  capability  in capitals;  it is also
based  on  the development  of points  of common  interest  with  similarly  minded  countries  and  delegations.
Informal  Consultations. Any institution  such as the WTO, and the GATT  before it, which
is based on consensus  must develop  a variety  of processes  both  formal and  informal,  in order to reach
decisions.  In principle,  any  single  member  of the institution  can block a decision  by casting  a negative- 15 -
vote.  It was clear,  even in the context of the GATT where the developing countries had a majority
of the votes but played a decidedly lesser role, that it would be futile to attempt to exercise voting
strength either to block major progress or to force developed countries to implement obligations not
freely accepted (Evans 1968).  In practice there is rarely,  if ever, any voting.  This puts a premium
on consultation,  both formal and informal, that builds consensus.
As the WTO now has more than 130 members, it is very difficult to conduct consultations,
or for that matter any kind of business activity, when everybody has to be consulted about everything.
Thus, while the General Council, the ultimate decision making body where all members are represented,
as well as all the various subsidiary bodies and committees meet frequently, informal consultations
take place  even more  often.  When issues of  importance to the Organization  as a  whole  require
consultations, these usually involve the Director General and a smaller group of members, that include
the  major  trading  countries,  both  developed and  developing,  and  others  who  are judged  to  be
representative of the views of the remaining membership. The actual composition of this group (called
the  "Green Room Group" because it meets at the Director General's  green conference room) tends
to vary by issue.  But on issues of general importance to the organization it could consist of upwards
of thirty members.  Given that in such meetings, the representative of the European Commission speaks
on behalf of the fifteen members of the European Communities, developing countries, typically form
the majority of "voices" in such consultations.'6
" 6For a period in the late 1970's and early 1980's an effort was made to formalize the establishment
of a smaller group of countries which would be used as a vehicle for regular consultations in the GATT.
This so called  "Consultative Group of Eighteen" included 10 developing countries. Although from
time to time there have been suggestions to revive such a group in the context of the WTO, it has not
been possible to reconstitute such a group, in part because of difficulties in accommodating all the
various countries who would want to participate, because they would not feel that other members would
adequately represent their interests. As a consequence  the present loose and flexible consultation formula
has remained in place.  It is interesting in this regard that neither the weighted voting nor the related
representation  formula, whereby one country represents  a number of others (frequently  of vastly different
level of development) present in the decision making bodies of the IMF and the World Bank, has been
at all in favour in the WTO. It also interesting to note that despite the disparity between trade weights
and voting strength, both the GATT and the WTO have been able to function perhaps for the reasons
discussed by Evans (1968).- 16 -
Developing countries often do not have a common position on  major issues before the WTO.
There is a Developing Country Group in the WTO that holds consultations from the time to time; and
the developing countries consult on trade policies issues of importance to them in the context of the
G-77 in UNCTAD.  However,  the establishment of common positions, that will encompass all the
developing countries members of the WTO as a group, is becoming more of a challenge as there are
growing disparities in their income levels, their trading interests, their integration in the international
economy, their institutional capacities and their participation in WTO affairs. Some of these countries,
e.g. Korea, Mexico and Turkey, are also members of the OECD and on some issues share the outlook
of the developed countries members of that group. Others, find that, on some issues, their  interests
tend to coincide with developed country  members and hence participate in groups with mixed developed-
developing country memberships.
Agriculture is one such issue. The "Cairns Group", perhaps the most well known and formal
of these groups, consists of a mixed membership of exporters of agricultural products, and includes
such countries as Australia, but also Argentina, Hungary and Thailand. The interests of these exporters
may at times be quite different from those of a large number of developing countries which are net
importers of foodstuffs.
Two other informal groups of mixed membership are worth noting: The so called "Invisible
Group" consists of officials from trade ministries of major trading countries, balanced between both
developed and developing countries (including the so-called "quad" group of  Canada, the EC, Japan
and the US, but also such developing countries as Brazil, India and Korea). It meets in Geneva, perhaps
twice a year, with the participation of the Director General to discuss, usually in general terms, up-
coming issues of importance to the WTO.  The other, is the so called "Beau-Rivage Group",  which
includes  the Geneva based representatives of  a  number of  smaller  countries both developed  and- 17 -
developing, that share an active participation in WTO affairs and a commitment to the multilateral
trading system.  17
In addition to these groups, the development of a consensus involves numerous other meetings
in formal or informal settings. For example, developing countries consult in regional groupings,  such
as the Africa group or  ASEAN as well as in context of groups with a wider agenda such the G-15,
or in the context of sectorally oriented bodies such as International Textiles and Clothing Bureau or
in smaller caucuses among like-rninded  countries  whose composition  sometimes includes  both developed
and developing countries. The 30-35 developing countries with an  active representation at the WTO
are usually important participants in these consultations.  One of the problems that some developing
countries have voiced is that they lack an institutional structure such as the one provided  by OECD
for the developed countries in which to undertake research and analyses as well as develop proposals
of interest to a large group of developing countries,  which can then be presented  at the WTO for
consideration by its full membership.' 8
The Agenda. New Issues and Agreements.  Partly because of the lack of such a forum  and
partly because of their own institutional weaknesses, many developing countries feel handicapped in
contributing to settting the WTO agenda. As in other fields, the largest number of participants in the
recently concluded agreements on Telecommunications, Information Technology and Financial Services
agreements reached in the WTO during 1997 are developing countries. However,  the initiative for
all three agreements, as well for the "new issues" that have emerged on the WTO agenda following
the Singapore Ministerial,  came in large measure from the developed countries, which also account
for the bulk of  world trade in the goods and services involved. At the same time, it is quite clear that
'7This is similar in composition and orientation with the "De la Paix Group" active during the
Uruguay Round.
'80n  some  issues,  e.g.  investment, developing countries continue to look to UNCTAD  as an
institution in which such analyses and positions can be developed. UNCTAD has also provided a forum
for discussion of broader aspects of a trade policy agenda for developing countries (see e.g. UNCTAD
1997).- 18 -
none of the agreements  could have  been put in place  without  the active  support  provided  by a number
of developing  countries from East Asia and Latin America.
VI.  Institutional  Capacitv
Effective  participation  in the WTO  and representation  of developing  country  interests  depends
critically  on the development  of an adequate  institutional  capacity  in  the developing  countries  themselves.
The increasing  range and complexity  of issues  handled  by the WTO, some of which  are becoming
very technical,  implies  that the capacity  of developing  countries  to participate  effectively  in the work
of the WTO will depend  very heavily  on the analytical  capacity  and  strength  of the governmental  and
other institutions  handling  the range of WTO issues  in capitals.  This is all the more so  in the WTO,
a member  driven  organization,  with  a very  small  secretariat,  where  a great  deal of the analysis  of issues
and development  of positions  is done by the members,  usually  in capitals.
Institutional  weaknesses  of developing  countries  have  received  fonnal  recognition  in the Uruguay
Round  agreements  which  contain  provisions  for special  and  differential  treatment  of developing  countries
in a number  of areas  especially  in Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary,  Standards  and  TRIPS, permitting  longer
implementation  periods and/or the provision  of technical  assistance  to strengthen  their institutional
capacity  to meet  their  obligations  under  the agreements.  Developing  countries  face  a variety  of challenges
in this regard: the drafting of appropriate  legislation  and regulations,  the meeting of procedural
notification  requirements,  the staffing  of government  institutions  with technical  personnel  able to
implement the policies and commitments  undertaken and the monitoring of trading partners'
implementation  of WTO  obligations  to assess  whether  market  access  has  been  unfairly  denied  or trade
rights infringed  -- as well as to prepare  an appropriate  response  (UNCTAD  and WTO, 1996).
These weaknesses have been clear for some time, especially in the context of Africa
(Oyejide, 1997). They are frequently  glaring for the more than 50 developing  countries  with weak- 19  -
representation at the WTO - and some others as well; and they were amply documented in the recent
assessments of technical assistance needs prepared by least developed countries in connection with the
High  Level Meeting  on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries'  Trade Development
(HLMLDCTD), which took place in Geneva in October 1997. All eleven needs assessments completed
so far requested assistance  in strengthening  domestic institutions  that support international  trade including,
for example, through staff training of Trade Ministries and Customs Offices, preparation of legislation
and regulations, and the development  of a local capacity  to enable countries  to participate more effectively
in future  discussions and  negotiations especially in the  "new issues" handled by  the  WTO  (See
WT/COMTD/IF/1-1 1).
Given these weaknesses, it is often very difficult for countries to undertake the analytical work
required for the development of new initiatives or for responses to proposals prepared by others.  As
Oyejide notes, as  long as  "particular countries were willing  to subordinate their  interests  to those
generally articulated by and broadly acceptable to all developing countries, their participation was not
particularly resource intensive at the individual country level. Because interests were not extensively
differentiated, it was not necessary to be adequately represented at every meeting, nor was it required
for such representatives to be supported by full documentation and background information on each
issue being discussed and for the negotiators to receive prompt and adequate instructions from their
home capitals. The more differentiated nature of their participation has called for support of the types
which have never systematically built up over the years"  (Oyejide, 1990, p.442).
In the absence of institutional capacity in the government, countries have had also to rely on
outside consultants to represent them at meetings in the WTO.  When this is done without a presence
in  Geneva,  it  can  lead to  confusion  and  misunderstandings  as  the  Sierra  Leone  experience  of
representation  at the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment suggests  (Chaytor and Hindley, 1997).
Unless these weaknesses start to be addressed, merely strengthening these countries'  representation
in Geneva will not go very far in enhancing their participation in the WTO.- 20 -
The main burden for strengthening  institutional  capacity  has to be borne by the developing
countries  themselves. However,  as Jan  Pronk, Chairman  of the HLMLDCTD,  stated  in his opening
statement  to the meeting "...foreign  assistance  can help, but often did not. Too often supply driven
assistance  and  incoherent  diagnoses  from  a wide  range  of development  agencies,  undercut  the domestic
will to reform: too much expatriate  technical  assistance  and proliferation  of donor schemes  overtaxed
the domestic  capacity  to reform and led to confusion  and duplication."' 9
A systematic  review  of the assistance  efforts  of the international  community  in  support  of trade
development  in developing  countries is beyond the scope of this paper.  Some of the themes and
conclusions  drawn  from the HLMLDCTD  however,  are worth  noting  both  because  of their relevance
to the LDCs  whose  problems  of effective  participation  in  the WTO  are most acute  and  because  of their
wider applicability  to other developing  countries.
An important  conclusion  of the meeting  is that it is not the lack of assistance  as such that is
the problem, but rather that it has been supply  driven, not effectively  coordinated  and the reforms
supported  are not "owned"  by the recipient  countries.  In recent  periods, assistance  in the trade field
has declined  significantly  from some donor  agencies,  e.g. UNDP.  In the case  of the World Bank,  the
focus  on trade development  in  general  has  declined  by comparison  to the late 1980's and  early 1990's.
The World Bank shut down its Geneva  office in the early 1990's and the share of its trade related
operations  relative  to the total operations  approved  in the 1996  fiscal  year was half of what it was in
fiscal  year 1991  (Nogues,  1997).2°  The  WTO  on  the other  hand,  has increased  its technical  co-operation
activities. But the bulk  of the financing  for these activities,  perhaps  as much as three quarters  in any
'9WTO High Level Meeting on Integrated  Initiatives for Least-Developed  Countries' Trade
Development,  Chairman's Opening  Statement,  Geneva,  October  27, 1997.
'Nogues notes in this connection  that, "It would  be a historical  error of major proportions  for
the Bank to conclude  that because  so much has been achieved  (in trade reform), there remains  no
significant  progress  to be expected  from investing  additional  intellectual  and  financial  resources  in  this
area." ( Nogues, 1997,  p.94).- 21 -
given year, is funded  by trust funds provided  by bilateral  donors, while the WTO itself typically  allocates
for technical co-operation activities less than one per cent of its total annual budget.
In order to help address some of the problems faced by the Least Developed Countries the
HLMLDCTD adopted an Integrated Framework for trade related technical assistance to support LDCs.
The framework envisages the preparation of needs assessments for technical assistance by the LDCs
themselves which are then discussed at Roundtables with the six agencies involved in the effort (IMF,
ITC, UNDP, UNCTAD,  World Bank and WTO) plus other interested donors, in order  to develop
an integrated program of technical assistance activities which focus primarily on institution building.
Beyond the Integrated Framework, deliberations at the HLMLDCTD raised two other issues:
That helping LDCs strengthen their institutional capacity may require not only technical assistance,
but also financial assistance inter alia for human resource development and trade finance; and that
problems of the LDCs are shared by other low income developing countries, and that the differences
are primarily  a matter of degree.
VII.  Conclusions and Recommendations
The analysis suggests the emergence of a duality in the representation  and participation of
developing countries in the WTO: On the one hand there are many developing countries which have
increased significantly their capacity to participate in WTO activities in the aftermath of the Uruguay
Round and whose representatives are playing an active role in the decisions of the organization. Their
participation in formal and informal decision making processes is substantial, although they frequently
do not speak with one voice as their interests, depending on the issue, may diverge and result in the
forming of different coalitions. This is very much consistent with had been anticipated at the time of
the Uruguay Round (Whalley, 1987).- 22 -
This  does  not imply  that  the consultation  process  always  results  in the development  of a consensus
that reflects the interests  of the majority  of the developing  countries.  For example,  many developing
countries  felt that in advance  of the Singapore  Ministerial,  their views  on some issues, for example
the future  work  of the WTO  on investment,  were  not fully  taken  into  account.  But,  if there  was  a  problem
in that regard, it could not be traced  to the absence  of effective  representation.
On the other hand, there is an even larger group of primarily smaller and lower income
developing  countries, which  account  for  more  than  50  %  of total  WTO  developing  country  membership,
for which effective  representation  and participation  in the Organization's  activities  is still a serious
problem.  Their situation  has  changed  little since  the early 1980's.  Most  are not represented  in  Geneva
and hence  can not effectively  participate  in the consultations  leading  to the development  of consensus
on which the WTO is based. Their staffing  has not increased  significantly,  while the complexity  of
the issues and the number  of meetings  and obligations  in the WTO has multiplied  significantly.
The  fact  that  the average  size of mission  increased  both  for developed  and  developing  countries
reflects  the increasing  complexity  and range  of issues  handled  by the WTO.  This is probably  the main
reason  for these  increases  in  staffing  during  a period  of explosive  improvements  in  telecommunications
and hence  in the ability  of governments  to increase  their missions'  capacity  to comnmunicate  rapidly
with capitals  -- and thereby reduce the needs for stationing  staff  abroad.
For many  developing  countries  and especially  for the least  developed  and some  of the smaller
island economies,  institutional  weaknesses  are the major  constraints  in both meeting  their obligations
under the WTO and in effective  participation  in the Organization  and representation  of their interests.
But, it must be recognized  that institutional  development  is a complex  process,  that takes  a great deal
of time. As a consequence,  the solution  of the problems  of representation  of the developing  countries
in the WTO is not going to be easy and is not often amenable  to quick, stroke-  of- the- pen changes- 23 -
in policies or rules.  This being said there are a number of things that can be done, some of which
should start now, although their payoff may be long term.
First, developing countries which are not members of the WTO, should apply to accede. There
is little to be gained by not being members and the potential that membership offers easily outweighs
the costs, especially if one were to consider the risks of adverse discrimination resulting from staying
outside the organization that sets the rules by which world trade is conducted. Perhaps the main benefits
from participation derive from agreeing to and being legally bound by rules and procedures which
pose obstacles to increasing protection in the future as well as access to a dispute settlement body which
treats all members equally, irrespective of trading power.  For these reasons, membership is beneficial
even for countries or territories which are unable to develop in the short run the institutional capacity
and the requirements for effective participation discussed earlier.
Second, developing countries which are already members, need to ensure that the effectiveness
of their participation is not impaired by such matters as not paying their membership dues. The amounts
involved are typically very small; falling in arrears in their payments can not be a cost effective policy
even in circumstances of countries facing serious budget constraints.
Third, the matter of effective participation through Geneva Missions of the appropriate size
is a complex  issue for which  there are no general solutions. For  some countries with very small
international representation in general, it may not be optimal  use of scarce human and material resources
to set up such Missions. In such cases, the main objective should be twofold: (a) to ensure that they
have adequate information flow on the issues handled by the WTO and how they affect their interests;
and (b) to identify like rninded countries or groups which do have effective representation, develop
a process of consultation with them  and thereby obtain some assurance that their interests are reflected
on an ongoing basis. Some of the alternatives that countries need to explore in this connection are first,
whether they can pool their resources and representation in Geneva in the context of regional groupings- 24 -
to which they belong; and second,  to determine whether they can second one or more staff to already
established Missions  in Geneva of like-minded countries. 2'
For other countries, measures to increase effective representation in Geneva should be taken
paripassu  with measures to strengthen their institutional capacity at home, as part of a broader decision
to become more effectively integrated in the international trading system. For these countries as well,
adequate information flow to the appropriate  ministries or other decision making bodies in capitals
is essential and should be addressed at the earliest. At the same time, they need to initiate efforts to
strengthen the policy making and implementation capacity of these  institutions as well as to seek
assistance for this purpose from international donors and the WTO itself.
The Integrated Framework of Trade  Related Technical Assistance for the Least Developed
Countries should be of help to this group of countries. These countries may also benefit from assistance
provided  by the  Swiss authorities  in setting up  a physical presence  in Geneva.  But  institutional
weaknesses are not limited to the least developed countries; nor should technical and other assistance
to strengthen these capacities. Indeed, the Uruguay Round agreements call for the provision of technical
assistance to all developing countries in a number of areas, such as SPS and standards.  Yet,  few
developing countries have sought such assistance so far.
Fourth, the WTO should undertake a review of its internal rules and procedures to ensure that
they do not inadvertedly prejudice the effective participation of developing countries. An example of
one such rule is  the provision that delegations of countries  presenting cases before the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB)  include only government employees. This implies that developing countries with very
2 1Blackhurst (1  997b) recommends that a minimum number of representatives of each WTO mission
be funded through the budget of the WTO, much as the Executive Directors and their staff are funded
by the budgets of the World Bank and the IMF.  While on the face of it such a proposal may seem
to have merit, it is not feasible without a major redefinition of the WTO as an institution. The reason
is that, unlike the WTO, the Executive Directors of the Bretton Woods institutions play a dual role:
they are both representatives of their governments and officers of the two institutions.- 25 -
limited  government legal staff could not include in their delegations foreign lawyers hired to advise
them on their cases. While the appellate body and one of the panels, have ruled in recent cases to permit
such lawyers to participate, this is one example of a rule that inadvertedly may prejudice developing
country participation in the WTO. There may be others which should be reviewed, especially in the
context of the forthcoming review of the DSB.
Fifth, the international community should  place higher priority to the more effective integration
of the developing countries in the international trading system and their participation in the WTO.
While many developing countries have made great strides in this connection, institutional weaknesses
are glaring and impose serious constraints in many others. Donors in general, and  the Bretton Woods
institutions, UNDP,  WTO,  UNCTAD and the ITC in particular, should increase their  support and
assistance to well co-ordinated  programs of institutional development that enhance the capacity of
developing countries -- whether in the Least Developed country list or not -- to participate effectively
in the international trading system, and to permit them to meet their obligations in the WTO.  Such
an institutional  strengthening is a sine qua non  for effective  representation  of developing  country interests
in the WTO, as well as for the accession to the WTO of countries which are not yet members.
Finally, keeping in mind that the WTO is not a development assistance institution, it would
still appear desirable that  WTO review  the resources it allocates from its own budget to: (a) staffing
of analyses on issues of interest to developing country members, (b) technical assistance to developing
countries to enable them to discharge the obligations entailed by membership in the Organization and
(c) support of the accession process of others. Developing country members can promote their interests
in such  a  review  through  active participation in the WTO  Committee  on Budget  ,  Finance  and
Administration.
Issues of interest to developing countries and strenghtening their institutional capacity involve
many parts of the Organization and its Secretariat.  It is important that the Secretariat be adequately- 26 -
staffed to handle these matters, while preserving  the character of the WTO as a member driven
institution.' Also, ensuring  adequate  resources  to provide technical  assistance  does not necessarily
mean that the WTO should increase  its own staffing  for undertaking  technical  assistance  activities.
It does mean  that the WTO  should allocate  an appropriate  amount  of resources  from its budget  to the
tasks of supporting  effective participation  of all its membership  in its activities  and assisting  needy
non-members  in their accession  process, so as to become  a truly global institution.
2 The Development  Division  ( with  only about  two  and one  half professional  staff, excluding  the
Director, working  on strictly  development  issues) is only  one of several  Divisions  working  on issues
of actual  or potential  importance  to  developing  countries;  others  include Trade  Policies  Review,  Trade
and  Environment,  Agriculture  and  Textiles.Many  developing  countries  also  believe  that  greaterprogress
is needed  in staffing  the WTO Secretariat  with developing  country  nationals  in order to improve  the
staff's understanding  of developing  country  problems.TABLE  1
GATT/WTO Membership and World Trade
1982-1997
Countries/Territories  GATT/WTO  Membership  World Exports
Number  Per cent  Value in US $ Billion  Per cent of World Exports
1982  1987  _  1997  1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1  1997  1982  1  1987  1  1997
Developed  24  24  25  27.3  25.3  19.1  1,168  1,734  3,554  62.5  69.7  69.4
Developing  58  65  97  65.9  68.4  74.0  211  348  972  11.3  14.0  19.0
Others  6  6  9  6.8  6.3  6.9  57  84  97  3.0  3.4  1.9
Total GATT/WTO  88  95  131  100.0  100.0  100.0  1,436  2,166  4,623  76.8  87.1  90.3
Members
Non-Members  434  322  495  23.2  12.9  9.7
Total World  l  . ._  1,870  2,488  5,118  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: WTO, Statistical  Yearbook 1997; WTO Directory, 1982, 1987, 1997.TABLE 2a
Country Membership and Representation GATT/WTO  1982-1997
By Location and Number of Mission Staff
Countries/  1982  1987  1997
Territories
Geneva  Europe  Capitals  Geneva  Europe  Capitals  Geneva  Europe  Capitals
_____________  No.  Staff  No.  Saff  No.  Staff  No.  Staff  No.  Staff  No.  Staff  No.  Staff  No.  Staff  No.  Staff
Developed  24  99  24  120  _  24  166  1  1  2
Developing  40  120  14  15  4  5  45  147  15  21  5  5  64  277  26  60  7  7
Others  6  16  6  18  9  25
Total  70  235  14  15  4  5  75  285  15  21  5  5  97  468  26  61  8  9
TABLE 2b
Countries/  1982  1987  1997
Territories
T No. of Countries  Staff  ]  Staffl  Country  No. of Countries  Staff  J Staff/Country  No. of Countries  Staff  Staff/Country
Developed  24  99  4.1  24  120  5.0  25  169  6.8
Developing  58  140  2.4  65  173  2.7  97  344  3.5
Others  6  16  2.7  6  18  3.0  9  25  2.8
|  Total  |  88  |  255  |  2.9  95  311  3.3  131  538  4.1
Developing  40  120  3.0  45  147  3.3  64  280  4.4
(Geneva)
Source:  GATT/WTO, Directory  1982, 1987,  1997.TABLE 3
Country Composition of Chairmen/Vice-Chairmen
GATT  1982-1987  GATT  1982-1987  WTO  1997
General  Council  All Other Working
Countries/Territories  All other Committees under certain  and Subsidiary  Parties and
Permanent Committees & Organs  Arrangements,  MTN Codes,  Panels and  Bodies,  Committees
Groups  Committees and  (Plurilateral
WPs,  DSB, TPRB  Agreements,
WPs,_____  _  DSB,__  TPRB__  Accessions,  etc.)
1982  1987  1982  1987  1997
No.  Per Cent  No.  Per Cent  No.  Per Cent  No.  Per Cent  No.  Per Cent  No.  Per Cent
Developed  7  46.6  4  33.3  19  70.4  20  61  18  45.0  22  66.5
Developing  7  46.6  7  58.3  7  26.9  12  39  20  50.0  11  33.5
Others  1  6.8  1  8.4  1  3.7  0  2  5.0
Total  15  100.0  12  100.0  27  100.0  32  100.0  40  100.0  33  100.0
Source:  GATT/WTO Directory 1982, 1987, 1997- 30 -
ANNEX
Countrv  Membership  and Representation  GATT/WTO  1982-1997
By Location  and Number  of Mission  Staff
Geneva  Europe  Capitals
1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1997
Antigua-Barbuda  IL'  2L
Angola  1
Argentina  4  3  7  =
Australia  3  5  8
Austria  2  3  6
Bahrain  2
Bangladesh  3  3  4
Barbados  1Br
2 lBr  3Br
Belgium  2  3  8
Belize  lBr  I
Benin  6  lBr  3Br
Bolivia  3
Botswana
Brazil  4  6  11
Brunei  3
Bulgaria  1
Burkina  Faso  1Br  lBr  6Br
Burandi  3  3  1
Cameroon  1  3  3
Canada  S  6  9
Central African  Republic  1
Chad  lBr  IP]  3Br
Chile  3  3  7
Colombia  3  2  5
Congo  1  lBr  3Br
Costa Rica  4
Cote d'Ivoire  2  2  3
Cuba  3  3  5
Cyprus  2  2  2
Czech  Republic  2  2  3
Denmark  3  3  4
Dominica  2- 31 -
Geneva  Europe  Capitals
1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1997
Dominican  Republic  2  2  3
Djibuti  I
EC  9  13  18
Egypt  6  5  10
El Salvador  5
Equador  2
Fiji1
Finland  4  3  5
France  4  6  6
Gabon  6  1  2
Gambia  IBr
Germany  5  9  8
Ghana  3  4  3
Greece  2  2  5
Grenada  lBr
Guatemala  2
Guyana  IL  IL  IL
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau  lBr
Haiti  1  1  2  =
Honduras  2
Hong Kong  (3)4  5  6
Hungary  4  5  4
India  3  3  5
Indonesia  5  6  7
Ireland  2  2  4
Iceland  2  2  4
Israel  3  3  3
Italy  3  4  5
Jamaica  3  3  3
Japan  12  15  22
Kenya  1  2  3
Korea  5  7  17
Kuwait  1  2  2
Lesotho  3Br
Lichtenstein  IBe  2- 32 -
Geneva  Europe  Capitals
1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1997
Luxemburg  2  2  2
Macau  53Br
Madagascar  3  2  3
Malaysia  4  3  3
Malawi  lBo
5 IBo  IBo
Maldives  _
Mali  4Bo
Malta  2  1  3
Morocco  2  5
Mauritius  4  lBr  lBr
Mauritania  lBr  lBr  2Br
Mexico  7  8
Mongolia  2
Mozambique  I
Myanmar  3  2  3
Namibia  3Br
Netherlands  3  3  4
New Zealand  3  5  5
Nicaragua  3  3  3
Niger  lBr  3Br  3Br
Nigeria  4  1  7
Norway  3  3  6
Pakistan  2  2  4
Papua New Guinea  lBr
Paraguay  4
Peru  4  4  6
Philippines  3  3  7
Poland  2  2  4
Portugal  3  2  2
Qatar  1
Romania  3  2  3
Rwanda  IBo  3Bo  IBo
St. Christ. & Nevis  IL
St. Lucia  4Br
St. Vincent & Grenadines  _
Senegal  2  2  2- 33 -
Geneva  Europe  Capitals
1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1997  1982  1987  1997
Sierra  Leone  2R
7 lBr  2Br
Singapore  3  3  5  _
Slovakia  2
Slovenia  2
Solomon Islands  2Br
South Africa  3  5  6
Spain  6  7  10
SriLanka  I  1  3
Swaiziland
Sweden  3  5  4
Switzerland  3  3  5
Surinam  l_H
8 H  SBr
Tanzania  2  7  5
Thailand  5  18
Togo  IP  iP  IP
Trinidad  4  5  5
Tunisia  3
Turkey  6  4  7
Uganda  5
United Arab Emirates  2
United Kingdom  4  4  5  =  =  =  = 
United States  8  10  10
Uruguay  2  4  7
Venezuela  6
Yugoslavia  2  4  __
Zaire  (Dem.Rep.  of Congo)  4  3  1  _
Zambia  4  IL  2
Zimbabwe  5  4  _
'L  =  London
2 Br  =  Brussels
3  p  =  Paris
4 Listed separately in UK mission in 1982
'Bo  =  Bonn
6 Be  =  Berne
'7R  =  Rome
sH  =  Hague- 34 -
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